Computational Theory and Mathematics, Artificial Intelligence
42
Scopus Publications
870
Scholar Citations
12
Scholar h-index
17
Scholar i10-index
Scopus Publications
Truthful and Welfare-maximizing Resource Scheduling with Application to Electric Vehicles Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Aamas, 2025
Harmonious Balanced Partitioning of a Network of Agents Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Aamas, 2025
A Gale-Shapley View of Unique Stable Marriages Kartik Gokhale, Amit Kumar Mallik, Ankit Kumar Misra, Swaprava Nath Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, 2024 Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore a new set of sufficient conditions for unique stable matching (USM) under this setup. Unlike other approaches that also address this question using the structure of preference profiles, we use an algorithmic viewpoint and investigate if this question can be answered using the lens of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm without actually running the algorithm. Our results yield a set of sufficient conditions for USM (viz., MP and MR) and show that these are disjoint from the previously known sufficiency conditions like sequential preference and no crossing. We provide a characterization of MP that makes it efficiently verifiable (without using DA), and shows the gap between MP and the entire USM class.
Removing Bias and Incentivizing Precision in Peer-grading Anujit Chakraborty, Jatin Jindal, Swaprava Nath Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2024 Most peer-evaluation practices rely on the evaluator’s goodwill and model them as potentially noisy evaluators. But what if graders are competitive, i.e., enjoy higher utility when their peers get lower scores? We model the setting as a multi-agent incentive design problem and propose a new mechanism, PEQA, that incentivizes these agents (peer-graders) through a score-assignment rule and a grading performance score. PEQA is designed in such a way that it makes grader-bias irrelevant and ensures grader-utility to be monotonically increasing with the grading-precision, despite competitiveness. When grading is costly and costs are private information of the individual graders, a modified version of PEQA implements the socially optimal grading-choices in equilibrium. Data from our classroom experiments is consistent with our theoretical assumptions and show that PEQA outperforms the popular median mechanism, which is used in several massive open online courses (MOOCs).
Charging Electric Vehicles Fairly and Efficiently Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Aamas, 2024
Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Swaprava Nath, Alexandros A. Voudouris Mathematical Programming, 2024 When a company undergoes a merger or transfers its ownership, the existing governing body has an opinion on which buyer should take over as the new owner. Similar situations occur while assigning the host of big sports tournaments, like the World Cup or the Olympics. In all these settings, the values of the external bidders are as important as the opinions of the internal experts. Motivated by such scenarios, we consider a social welfare maximizing approach to design and analyze truthful mechanisms inhybrid social choicesettings, where payments can be imposed to the bidders, but not to the experts. Since this problem is a combination of mechanism design with and without monetary transfers, classical solutions like VCG cannot be applied, making this a novel mechanism design problem. We consider the simple but fundamental scenario with one expert and two bidders, and provide tight approximation guarantees of the optimal social welfare. We distinguish between mechanisms that use ordinal and cardinal information, as well as between mechanisms that base their decisions on one of the two sides (either the bidders or the expert) or both. Our analysis shows that the cardinal setting is quite rich and admits several non-trivial randomized truthful mechanisms, and also allows for closer-to-optimal welfare guarantees.
Optimal Referral Auction Design Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Aamas, 2024
Fair Scheduling of Indivisible Chores Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Aamas, 2024
Preference elicitation for participatory budgeting 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence Aaai 2017, 2017
Efficiency and budget balance Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm Lecture Notes in Computer Science Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics, 2016
Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Productive output in hierarchical crowdsourcing 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Aamas 2014, 2014
A mechanism to optimally balance cost and quality of labeling tasks outsourced to strategic agents 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Aamas 2014, 2014
Threats and Trade-Offs in Resource Critical Crowdsourcing Tasks over Networks Proceedings of the 26th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence Aaai 2012, 2012
Dynamic mechanism design for markets with strategic resources Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence Uai 2011, 2011
Fair Allocation under Conflict Constraints S Equbal, R Gurjar, A Igarashi, Y Kumar, P Manurangsi, S Nath, ... arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.09930 , 2026 2026
Temporal Cooperative Games A Goyal, D Doshi, S Nath arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.11255 , 2025 2025
Likes, Budgets, and Equilibria: Designing Contests for Socially Optimal Advertising S Mandal, H Agrawal, S Nath arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.11253 , 2025 2025
Mechanism Design in Social Networks DZ Dong Hao, Bin Li, Swaprava Nath, Taiki Todo 2025
“You are Beautiful, Body Image Stereotypes are Ugly!” BIStereo: A Benchmark to Measure Body Image Stereotypes in Language Models N Asad, NR Sahoo, R Murthy, S Nath, P Bhattacharyya Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025, 24471-24496 , 2025 2025 Citations: 1
Truthful and Welfare-maximizing Resource Scheduling with Application to Electric Vehicles R Anandanarayanan, S Nath, P Misra Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and … , 2025 2025
Harmonious Balanced Partitioning of a Network of Agents P Agarwal, H Agarwal, V Raj, S Nath Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and … , 2025 2025 Citations: 3
Incentivize Contribution and Learn Parameters Too: Federated Learning with Strategic Data Owners D Doshi, AVR Kesari, A Ghosh, S Nath, SS Kowshik arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.12010 , 2025 2025
One prompt to rule them all: LLMs for opinion summary evaluation T Siledar, S Nath, S Muddu, R Rangaraju, S Nath, P Bhattacharyya, ... Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational … , 2024 2024 Citations: 23
Distilling opinions at scale: Incremental opinion summarization using xl-opsumm SR Muddu, R Rangaraju, T Siledar, S Nath, P Bhattacharyya, S Nath, ... arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.10886 , 2024 2024 Citations: 2
Distilling Opinions at Scale: Incremental Opinion Summarization using XL-OPSUMM S Raghava Muddu, R Rangaraju, T Siledar, S Nath, P Bhattacharyya, ... arXiv e-prints, arXiv: 2406.10886 , 2024 2024
Product description and qa assisted self-supervised opinion summarization T Siledar, R Rangaraju, S Muddu, S Banerjee, A Patil, S Singh, ... Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: NAACL 2024, 2315-2332 , 2024 2024 Citations: 10
Fair scheduling of indivisible chores Y Kumar, S Equbal, R Gurjar, S Nath, R Vaish Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and … , 2024 2024 Citations: 9
Charging Electric Vehicles Fairly and Efficiently. R Anandanarayanan, S Nath, R Vaish AAMAS, 2126-2128 , 2024 2024
Removing bias and incentivizing precision in peer-grading A Chakraborty, J Jindal, S Nath Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 79, 1001-1046 , 2024 2024 Citations: 11
Fair Interval Scheduling of Indivisible Chores S Equbal, R Gurjar, Y Kumar, S Nath, R Vaish arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.04353 , 2024 2024 Citations: 2
Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice I Caragiannis, A Filos-Ratsikas, S Nath, AA Voudouris Mathematical programming 203 (1), 871-900 , 2024 2024 Citations: 12
A Gale-Shapley View of Unique Stable Marriages K Gokhale, AK Mallik, AK Misra, S Nath arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.18736 , 2023 2023 Citations: 1
Truthful and Equitable Lateral Transshipment in Multi-Retailer Systems. G Shakya, SKR Danda, S Nath, P Dayama, SSK Sajja ECAI, 2113-2120 , 2023 2023
Disentangling societal inequality from model biases: gender inequality in divorce court proceedings S Dutta, P Srivastava, V Solunke, S Nath, AR KhudaBukhsh arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.10200 , 2023 2023 Citations: 7
MOST CITED SCHOLAR PUBLICATIONS
Preference elicitation for participatory budgeting G Benade, S Nath, AD Procaccia, N Shah Management Science 67 (5), 2813-2827 , 2021 2021 Citations: 212
Game-theoretic modeling of human adaptation in human-robot collaboration S Nikolaidis, S Nath, AD Procaccia, S Srinivasa Proceedings of the 2017 ACM/IEEE international conference on human-robot … , 2017 2017 Citations: 199
Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting I Caragiannis, S Nath, AD Procaccia, N Shah Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 58, 123-152 , 2017 2017 Citations: 138
Mechanism design for time critical and cost critical task execution via crowdsourcing S Nath, P Dayama, D Garg, Y Narahari, J Zou International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 212-226 , 2012 2012 Citations: 31
Theory and algorithms for hop-count-based localization with random geometric graph models of dense sensor networks S Nath, VN Ekambaram, A Kumar, PV Kumar ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN) 8 (4), 1-38 , 2012 2012 Citations: 29
Efficiency and Budget Balance in General Quasi-linear Domains S Nath, T Sandholm Games and Economic Behavior 113 (2019), 673-693 , 2019 2019 Citations: 24
One prompt to rule them all: LLMs for opinion summary evaluation T Siledar, S Nath, S Muddu, R Rangaraju, S Nath, P Bhattacharyya, ... Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational … , 2024 2024 Citations: 23
Algorithmic mechanism design for egalitarian and congestion-aware airport slot allocation AK Dixit, G Shakya, SK Jakhar, S Nath Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 169, 102971 , 2023 2023 Citations: 14
Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations S Nath, O Zoeter, Y Narahari, CR Dance Review of Economic Design 19 (3), 211-228 , 2015 2015 Citations: 14
Skillcheck: An incentive-based certification system using blockchains J Gupta, S Nath 2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC), 1-3 , 2020 2020 Citations: 13
Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice I Caragiannis, A Filos-Ratsikas, S Nath, AA Voudouris Mathematical programming 203 (1), 871-900 , 2024 2024 Citations: 12
A parameterized perspective on protecting elections P Dey, N Misra, S Nath, G Shakya Theoretical Computer Science 874, 15-31 , 2021 2021 Citations: 12
Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations S Nath, A Sen ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 3 (4), 1-19 , 2015 2015 Citations: 12
Removing bias and incentivizing precision in peer-grading A Chakraborty, J Jindal, S Nath Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 79, 1001-1046 , 2024 2024 Citations: 11
Productive output in hierarchical crowdsourcing S Nath, B Narayanaswamy Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and … , 2014 2014 Citations: 11
Product description and qa assisted self-supervised opinion summarization T Siledar, R Rangaraju, S Muddu, S Banerjee, A Patil, S Singh, ... Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: NAACL 2024, 2315-2332 , 2024 2024 Citations: 10
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM/IEEE international conference on human-robot interaction S Nikolaidis, S Nath, AD Procaccia, S Srinivasa IEEE , 2017 2017 Citations: 10
Fair scheduling of indivisible chores Y Kumar, S Equbal, R Gurjar, S Nath, R Vaish Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and … , 2024 2024 Citations: 9
OMCoRP: An online mechanism for competitive robot prioritization SN Das, S Nath, I Saha Proceedings of the International Conference on Automated Planning and … , 2021 2021 Citations: 9
The social network effect on surprise in elections P Dey, PK Kothari, S Nath Proceedings of the ACM India Joint International Conference on Data Science … , 2019 2019 Citations: 9
