Gaëlle MARINTHE
@univ-paris8.fr
Department of Psychology/Laboratoire Parisien de Psychologie Sociale
Université Paris 8
My work is in the field of social identity and intra- and inter-group relations. Primarily, it aims to understand what are the determinants of defensive or secure social identity (e.g., collective narcissism/secure identification, blind/constructive patriotism) and what are the consequences for attitudes towards the ingroup and its members, and towards outgroups. I am also interested in the moderators of these consequences (e.g., normative contexts, group status, threat perception).
EDUCATION
10/2015 – 01/2020: PhD in Social Psychology – University Rennes 2 (LP3C)
Defended on 07/01/2020, University Rennes 2
Title: Psychosocial approach of national symbols’ desecration: consequences on intergroup relations, implication of identification and patriotism
Supervisors: Rodolphe Kamiejski (Lecturer, Rennes 2 University); Benoit Testé (Professor, Rennes 2 University)
Thesis examiners: Constantina Badea (Professor, University Paris Nanterre University), Maja Becker (Lecturer, University Toulouse Jean Jaurès), Serge Guimond (Professor, University Clermont Auvergne)
2014-2015: Master’s degree – University Paris Nanterre
Dissertation title: Religion and Politics: Helping Intention, Ideologies and Intergroup Relations.
Supervisor: Rodolphe Kamiejski
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Social identity; collective narcissism; intragroup relations; intergroup relations; social identity threat
Scopus Publications
Scholar Citations
Scholar h-index
Scholar i10-index
Scopus Publications
Bjarki Gronfeldt, Aleksandra Cislak, Gaëlle Marinthe, and Aleksandra Cichocka
SAGE Publications
We propose that defensive forms of identity (i.e., nationalism and national narcissism) can harm the nation through a tendency to maximize the difference between own and other groups in resource allocation. We test this hypothesis by adopting a classic social psychological paradigm, the Tajfel’s matrices, to real-life scenarios designed in the COVID-19 context. We captured maximizing the difference as a preference for one’s nation being allocated more medical resources relative to other countries, but at the expense of absolute ingroup profit. In Studies 1 and 2, defensiveness in national identity predicted this counterproductive strategy that ultimately benefits neither ingroup nor outgroup. In experimental Study 3, inducing ingroup disadvantage led to a greater tendency to maximize the difference. The results provide evidence that defensive national identity might be liked to support for policies that offer a positive intergroup comparison, but simultaneously harm one’s own ingroup.
Gaëlle Marinthe, Genavee Brown, Mioara Cristea, and Maja Kutlaca
Elsevier BV
Ramzi Abou-Ismail, Bjarki Gronfeldt, and Gaelle Marinthe
Elsevier BV
Genavee Brown and Gaëlle Marinthe
Ubiquity Press, Ltd.
National narcissism is associated with support for nationalist and anti-democratic leaders and decisions in one’s own country. We hypothesize that it might also relate to more favorable judgments of outgroup nationalist leaders and actions, even if the latter may pose a threat to the ingroup. Using the context of the Russian attack on Ukraine, we hypothesize that people with a higher level of national narcissism would be more supportive of Russian attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian people. This may be due to a higher perception of belief similarity to Putin and Russians. We also considered the moderating role of the explicit target of the attack (Ukraine vs. ingroup). We tested our hypotheses in two studies (Study 1: N = 339 French; Study 2: N = 400 Americans). In both studies, national narcissism was related to a judgment of the attack (on Ukraine or the ingroup) as less immoral and to a better opinion of Putin. These effects were mediated by perceived belief similarity. In both studies however, these less negative judgments of the attack and of Putin did not extend to Russian people. Our results highlight that national narcissists are inclined to support a nationalist outgroup leader and their violent actions, although these may ultimately harm the ingroup.
Gaëlle Marinthe, Aleksandra Cislak, Samantha Stronge, Mikey Biddlestone, Flavio Azevedo, Alice Kasper, Chris G. Sibley, and Aleksandra Cichocka
Wiley
AbstractCollective narcissism, a belief that one's group is exceptional and entitled to special treatment but underappreciated by others, is related to important social and political outcomes but has been predominantly studied in advantaged groups. The present research compares the motivational correlates (through values) of collective narcissism in ethnic groups of different status (advantaged and disadvantaged) and explores its associations with attitudes towards, and intention to engage in collective action. Three studies examined these processes in different national and intergroup contexts (total N = 16,275). Overall, ethnic collective narcissism was linked to self‐protective values (power, and less consistently, conservation) in advantaged groups but to universalism in disadvantaged groups. Moreover, in both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, ethnic collective narcissism was related to more positive attitudes towards, and intentions of pro‐ingroup actions but not to attitudes towards (other) disadvantaged groups (i.e., intergroup solidarity). These studies suggest that collective narcissism may be associated with different motivations, yet linked to similar intergroup attitudes among advantaged and disadvantaged groups.
Fanny Lalot, Gaëlle Marinthe, Alice Kasper, and Dominic Abrams
Leibniz Institute for Psychology (ZPID)
We tested how well the Identity-Deprivation-Efficacy-Action-Subjective-wellbeing (IDEAS) model predicts citizens’ intentions to engage in collective action opposing their government, and their subjective well-being. Representative samples from Scotland, Wales, and the county of Kent in England were surveyed during the COVID-19 pandemic in October 2020 (N = 1,536). Results largely support our preregistered hypotheses, confirming that the IDEAS model offers a valid explanatory framework for how relative deprivation predicts both collective action opposing one’s government and levels of subjective well-being. In the case of collective action, there were significant effects of collective relative deprivation (cognitive and affective) and collective efficacy on social change beliefs, which in turn positively predicted collective action intentions. The role of national identification was more nuanced, revealing both negative indirect effects via collective efficacy and relative deprivation, and a positive indirect effect via political orientation. Findings also suggest interesting directions for future research on national identification.
Gaëlle Marinthe, Benoit Testé, and Rodolphe Kamiejski
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
AbstractDesecration of national symbols is a recurring societal phenomenon that can lead to highly defensive reactions from some citizens, especially on the part of those expressing a strong attachment to the nation. In this paper, we investigated the effects of blind and constructive patriotism when faced with an ingroup (vs. outgroup) national flag burning on ingroup bias, taking into consideration the mediating role of perceived threat. In two studies (N = 252), the level of blind patriotism predicted stronger ingroup bias—due to more negative evaluation of visible minorities and/or more positive evaluation of the ingroup—when another ingroup member burnt an ingroup (vs. outgroup) flag. This effect was partly mediated by a greater threat to the group’s image perceived by blindly patriotic people when the ingroup (vs. outgroup) flag was burnt (Study 2). Study 2 also highlighted a main effect of the symbol: ingroup bias was stronger when the ingroup (vs. outgroup) flag was burnt. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to the role played by modes of national attachment and the consequences of desecrating symbols.
Gaëlle Marinthe, Aleksandra Cichocka, Aleksandra Cislak, Natasha Alexander‐Grose, and Flavio Azevedo
Wiley
Valerie van Mulukom, Lotte J. Pummerer, Sinan Alper, Hui Bai, Vladimíra Čavojová, Jessica Farias, Cameron S. Kay, Ljiljana B. Lazarevic, Emilio J.C. Lobato, Gaëlle Marinthe,et al.
Elsevier BV
Genavee Brown and Gaelle Marinthe
American Psychological Association (APA)
Paul Bertin, Gaëlle Marinthe, Mikey Biddlestone, and Sylvain Delouvée
Elsevier BV
Gaëlle Marinthe, Genavee Brown, Thibault Jaubert, and Peggy Chekroun
Elsevier BV
Gaëlle Marinthe, Genavee Brown, Sylvain Delouvée, and Daniel Jolley
Wiley
Objectives This research examined how conspiracy mentality may affect compliance with preventive health measures necessary to fight the COVID‐19 pandemic, and the underlying motivations to comply. Design and Method We conducted two cross‐sectional studies (Study 1 N = 762, Study 2 N = 229) on a French population, measuring conspiracy mentality, compliance with preventive health measures, and perceived risks related to COVID‐19. We also measured motivations to comply with preventive measures in Study 2. Results We show that people high in conspiracy mentality are likely to engage in non‐normative prevention behaviours (Study 1), but are less willing to comply with extreme preventive behaviours that are government‐driven (Study 2). However, we demonstrate that a perceived risk to oneself (risk of death) and a motivation to protect oneself can act as a suppressor: Conspiracy mentality is linked with an increase in the perception of risk to oneself, which, in turn, is associated with normative compliance. We also find that perceived risk of death explains the relationship between conspiracy mentality and non‐normative prevention behaviours. Conclusions Our studies showcase how people high in conspiracy theorizing may (dis)engage with prevention behaviours, but that perceived risk and motivation to protect oneself could increase these individuals’ compliance.
Gaëlle Marinthe, Juan Manuel Falomir-Pichastor, Benoit Testé, and Rodolphe Kamiejski
SAGE Publications
Desecrating a national symbol is a powerful means of protest or of showing antipathy for a national group, but how do such actions impact ingroup favoritism? We investigated this issue via two field studies conducted prior to the France versus Ireland (Study 1, N = 72) and France versus Germany (Study 2, N = 165) matches at the Euro 2016 soccer tournament. We asked French participants to imagine the ingroup/competition outgroup flag being burnt by ingroup/competition outgroup perpetrators. Imagining the ingroup flag being burnt increased proingroup bias through increase in either ingroup favoritism (Study 1) or outgroup derogation (for all outgroups, including those unconnected with the threat; Study 2). Perpetrators’ group membership did not have the expected moderating effect. We discuss the implications of these results for social identity defense strategies and for the consequences of intragroup versus intergroup threats.
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GRANT DETAILS
2022: Grant obtained in the campaign of AAP Recherche 2022 of the ComUE Université Paris Lumières, for the project "VALeur sociale des Identités DÉfensive et Sécure (VALIDÉS) [Social value of defensive and secure identities]". Awarded amount: 8,608€.
Project leader: Gaëlle Marinthe. Collaborators: Peggy Chekroun (University Paris Nanterre), Vincent Dru (University Paris Nanterre), Patrick Mollaret (University Paris 8)
2019: Mobility grant from the Rennes doctoral pole for participation in the ISPP conference in Lisbon. Awarded amount: 500 €.
2016: Mobility grant from ADRIPS for a doctoral research internship at the University of Geneva. Awarded amount: 900 €.