Robust Recovery and Control of Cyber-physical Discrete Event Systems under Actuator Attacks Samuel Oliveira, Mostafa Tavakkoli Anbarani, Gregory Beal, Ilya Kovalenko, Marcelo Teixeira, André B. Leal, Rômulo Meira-Góes Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2025 Critical real-world applications strongly rely on Cyber-physical systems (CPS), but their dependence on communication networks introduces significant security risks, as attackers can exploit vulnerabilities to compromise their integrity and availability. This work explores the topic of cybersecurity in the context of CPS modeled as discrete event systems (DES), focusing on recovery strategies following the detection of cyberattacks. Specifically, we address actuator enablement attacks and propose a method that preserves the system’s full valid behavior under normal conditions. Upon detecting an attack, our proposed solution aims to guide the system toward a restricted yet robust behavior, ensuring operational continuity and resilience. Additionally, we introduce a property termed AE-robust recoverability, which characterizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for recovering a system from attacks while preventing further vulnerabilities. Finally, we showcase the proposed solution through a case study based on a manufacturing system.
Integrity of Cyber-Physical Discrete Event Systems under covert actuator attacks Samuel Oliveira, André B. Leal, Marcelo Teixeira, Yuri K. Lopes IFAC Papersonline, 2024 The connectivity requirements brought by Industry 4.0 pose new challenges for cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as the strengthening of their resilience against cyberattacks. In this paper, we use the discrete event systems (DES) formalism to develop an approach that aims to protect CPS from covert actuator attacks using event permutation maps. In this approach, properly selected controllable events are permuted on the plant's site so that attacks on actuators do not have the impact on the plant as expected by the intruder and unsafe states are avoided. Furthermore, a property termed AE-protectability is presented to characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for the system to be protected against such attacks through event permutations. The proposed approach is applied to a case study where the Identification of the attack is done without causing damage while maintaining the integrity of the system.
Security of Cyber-Physical Systems Against Actuator Attacks through Cryptography Samuel Oliveira, André B. Leal, Marcelo Teixeira, Yuri K. Lopes 2023 International Conference on Information Technology Cybersecurity Challenges for Sustainable Cities Icit 2023 Proceeding, 2023 The connectivity demanded by Industry 4.0 poses new challenges for cyber-physical systems (CPS), notably bolstering resilience against cyberattacks. In this paper, the authors use the formalism of Discrete Event Systems (DES) to design an approach that aims to protect CPS against actuator attacks using event-based symmetric cryptography. In this approach, controllable events that are properly selected are encrypted before being transmitted from the controller to the plant, leading intruders to mistakenly infer the supervisor's control actions. Thus, attacks on actuators do not have the expected impact on the plant, preventing unsafe states from being reached. The proposed approach is applied to a case study from the literature, where the identification of the attack is done without causing any damage while maintaining the integrity of the system.