Alfredo Valencia Toledo

@unsaac.edu.pe

Departamento Académico de Matemáticas y Estadística
Universidad Nacional de San Antonio Abad del Cusco



           

https://researchid.co/avalencia

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Game theory. Operations Research. Statistics. Applied Mathematics. Microeconomics.

6

Scopus Publications

Scopus Publications


  • Developing models to assess the social impact of mining: An exploratory study trough necessary conditions analysis (NCA)
    Andrea Rey-Martí, Alfredo Valencia-Toledo, Nuria Chaparro-Banegas, Alicia Mas-Tur, and Norat Roig-Tierno
    Elsevier BV

  • A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements
    Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC
    We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.

  • Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
    Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC
    We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity.

  • Hart and Mas-Colell consistency in PERT problems
    Gustavo Bergantiños, Alfredo Valencia-Toledo, and Juan Vidal-Puga
    Elsevier BV
    Abstract The Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) is a tool used to schedule and coordinate activities in a complex project. In assigning the cost of a potential delay, we characterize the Shapley rule as the only rule that satisfies Hart and Mas-Colell consistency and other desirable properties.

  • Duality in land rental problems
    Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga
    Elsevier BV
    Abstract Land rental problems describe situations where one tenant demands land from several lessors. The way lessors rent their land can be seen as equivalent to a bankruptcy problem. We extend the idea of self-duality in bankruptcy problems to land rental problems. We provide a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy self-duality. Moreover, self-duality is enough to assure the proportional land share among lessors. Adding other reasonable properties, we pick up a single rule.