Adriana Navarro-Ramos

@univ-st-etienne.fr

Université Jean Monnet Saint-Étienne



                 

https://researchid.co/adriana_nr

RESEARCH, TEACHING, or OTHER INTERESTS

Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

7

Scopus Publications

26

Scholar Citations

2

Scholar h-index

Scopus Publications

  • Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values
    Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Adriana Navarro‐Ramos, and Philippe Solal
    Wiley
    AbstractWe introduce a new family of values for TU‐games with a priority structure, which both contains the Priority value recently introduced by Béal et al. and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai & Samet). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent and the agents are partially ordered according to a binary relation. An agent is a priority agent with respect to a coalition if it is maximal in this coalition with respect to the partial order. A Weighted priority value distributes the dividend of each coalition among the priority agents of this coalition in proportion to their weights. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of the Weighted Shapley values without the additivity axiom. To this end, we borrow the Priority agent out axiom from Béal et al., which is used to axiomatize the Priority value. We also reuse, in our domain, the principle of Superweak differential marginality introduced by Casajus to axiomatize the Positively weighted Shapley values. We add a new axiom of Independence of null agent position which indicates that the position of a null agent in the partial order does not affect the payoff of the other agents. Together with Efficiency, the above axioms characterize the Weighted Shapley values. We show that this axiomatic characterization holds on the subdomain where the partial order is structured by levels. This entails an alternative characterization of the Weighted Shapley values. Two alternative characterizations are obtained by replacing our principle of Superweak differential marginality by Additivity and invoking other axioms.

  • Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies
    Gustavo Bergantiños and Adriana Navarro-Ramos
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC
    AbstractThis paper considers agglomeration economies. A new firm is planning to open a plant in a country divided into several regions. Each firm receives a positive externality if the new plant is located in its region. In a decentralized mechanism, the plant would be opened in the region where the new firm maximizes its individual benefit. Due to the externalities, it could be the case that the aggregate utility of all firms is maximized in a different region. Thus, the firms in the optimal region could transfer something to the new firm in order to incentivize it to open the plant in that region. We propose two rules that provide two different schemes for transfers between firms already located in the country and the newcomer. The first is based on cooperative game theory. This rule coincides with the $$\\tau$$ τ -value, the nucleolus, and the per capita nucleolus of the associated cooperative game. The second is defined directly. We provide axiomatic characterizations for both rules. We characterize the core of the cooperative game. We prove that both rules belong to the core.

  • Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value for multi-choice games
    Sylvain Béal, Adriana Navarro-Ramos, Eric Rémila, and Philippe Solal
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC

  • A new approach to agglomeration problems
    A. Navarro-Ramos
    Elsevier BV



  • A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption
    Adriana Navarro-Ramos, , William Olvera-Lopez, and
    American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS)
    In this paper we show several results regarding to the classical cost sharing problem when each agent requires a set of services but they can share the benefits of one unit of each service, i.e. there is non rival consumption. Specifically, we show a characterized solution for this problem, mainly adapting the well-known axioms that characterize the Shapley value for TU-games into our context. Finally, we present some additional properties that the shown solution satisfy.

RECENT SCHOLAR PUBLICATIONS

  • On tuna fishing games
    A Navarro-Ramos, G Bergantinos
    Available at SSRN 5183225 2025

  • Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value for multi-choice games
    S Bal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rmila, P Solal
    Annals of Operations Research 345 (1), 59-103 2025

  • A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption
    A Navarro-Ramos, W Olvera-Lopez
     2025

  • Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values
    S Bal, S Ferrires, A Navarro‐Ramos, P Solal
    International Journal of Economic Theory 19 (4), 787-816 2023

  • Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies
    G Bergantios, A Navarro-Ramos
    International Journal of Game Theory 52 (1), 63-92 2023

  • Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value
    S Bal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rmila, P Solal
     2023

  • A new approach to agglomeration problems
    A Navarro-Ramos
    Operations Research Letters 50 (6), 639-645 2022

  • Axiomatic Characterizations of the Knapsack and Greedy Participatory Budgeting Methods
    F Ceron, S Gonzalez, A Navarro-Ramos
    Working paper (2022).(Cited on page 65) 2022

  • A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values
    S Bal, S Ferrires, A Navarro-Ramos, P Solal
     2022

  • On multi-source minimum cost spanning tree problems and agglomeration problems
    A Navarro Ramos
    Estatstica e investigacin operativa 2021

  • A characterization of the folk rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems
    G Bergantios, A Navarro-Ramos
    Operations Research Letters 47 (5), 366-370 2019

  • The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources
    G Bergantios, A Navarro-Ramos
    Mathematical Social Sciences 99, 43-48 2019

  • Characterization of the painting rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems
    G Bergantios, A Navarro
     2019

  • Soluciones axiomticas para un problema de distribucin de costos con consumo sin rivalidad
    A Navarro Ramos
    REPOSITORIO NACIONAL CONACYT 2015

MOST CITED SCHOLAR PUBLICATIONS

  • The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources
    G Bergantios, A Navarro-Ramos
    Mathematical Social Sciences 99, 43-48 2019
    Citations: 8

  • A characterization of the folk rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems
    G Bergantios, A Navarro-Ramos
    Operations Research Letters 47 (5), 366-370 2019
    Citations: 5

  • Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value for multi-choice games
    S Bal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rmila, P Solal
    Annals of Operations Research 345 (1), 59-103 2025
    Citations: 2

  • A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption
    A Navarro-Ramos, W Olvera-Lopez
     2025
    Citations: 2

  • Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies
    G Bergantios, A Navarro-Ramos
    International Journal of Game Theory 52 (1), 63-92 2023
    Citations: 2

  • Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value
    S Bal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rmila, P Solal
     2023
    Citations: 2

  • Axiomatic Characterizations of the Knapsack and Greedy Participatory Budgeting Methods
    F Ceron, S Gonzalez, A Navarro-Ramos
    Working paper (2022).(Cited on page 65) 2022
    Citations: 2

  • Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values
    S Bal, S Ferrires, A Navarro‐Ramos, P Solal
    International Journal of Economic Theory 19 (4), 787-816 2023
    Citations: 1

  • A new approach to agglomeration problems
    A Navarro-Ramos
    Operations Research Letters 50 (6), 639-645 2022
    Citations: 1

  • Soluciones axiomticas para un problema de distribucin de costos con consumo sin rivalidad
    A Navarro Ramos
    REPOSITORIO NACIONAL CONACYT 2015
    Citations: 1