Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
8
Scopus Publications
39
Scholar Citations
4
Scholar h-index
Scopus Publications
Cooperative game theoretic results from the tuna fishing problem Gustavo Bergantiños, Adriana Navarro-Ramos International Journal of Game Theory, 2025 Bergantiños et al. (2023) introduce cooperative tuna fishing games. We prove that the core of this game is not empty. We give an explicit formula for the $$\\tau $$ -value. We also study the distance game associated with tuna fishing games and prove that it is a generalized big boss game. In most practical cases, the number of vessels is two or three. In these cases, the core and the core cover coincide. Moreover, we provide an explicit formula for the nucleolus.
Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Adriana Navarro‐Ramos, Philippe Solal International Journal of Economic Theory, 2023 We introduce a new family of values for TU‐games with a priority structure, which both contains the Priority value recently introduced by Béal et al. and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai & Samet). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent and the agents are partially ordered according to a binary relation. An agent is a priority agent with respect to a coalition if it is maximal in this coalition with respect to the partial order. A Weighted priority value distributes the dividend of each coalition among the priority agents of this coalition in proportion to their weights. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of the Weighted Shapley values without the additivity axiom. To this end, we borrow the Priority agent out axiom from Béal et al., which is used to axiomatize the Priority value. We also reuse, in our domain, the principle of Superweak differential marginality introduced by Casajus to axiomatize the Positively weighted Shapley values. We add a new axiom of Independence of null agent position which indicates that the position of a null agent in the partial order does not affect the payoff of the other agents. Together with Efficiency, the above axioms characterize the Weighted Shapley values. We show that this axiomatic characterization holds on the subdomain where the partial order is structured by levels. This entails an alternative characterization of the Weighted Shapley values. Two alternative characterizations are obtained by replacing our principle of Superweak differential marginality by Additivity and invoking other axioms.
Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies Gustavo Bergantiños, Adriana Navarro-Ramos International Journal of Game Theory, 2023 This paper considers agglomeration economies. A new firm is planning to open a plant in a country divided into several regions. Each firm receives a positive externality if the new plant is located in its region. In a decentralized mechanism, the plant would be opened in the region where the new firm maximizes its individual benefit. Due to the externalities, it could be the case that the aggregate utility of all firms is maximized in a different region. Thus, the firms in the optimal region could transfer something to the new firm in order to incentivize it to open the plant in that region. We propose two rules that provide two different schemes for transfers between firms already located in the country and the newcomer. The first is based on cooperative game theory. This rule coincides with the $$\\tau$$ τ -value, the nucleolus, and the per capita nucleolus of the associated cooperative game. The second is defined directly. We provide axiomatic characterizations for both rules. We characterize the core of the cooperative game. We prove that both rules belong to the core.
A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption Adriana Navarro-Ramos, William Olvera-Lopez, and Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2018 In this paper we show several results regarding to the classical cost sharing problem when each agent requires a set of services but they can share the benefits of one unit of each service, i.e. there is non rival consumption. Specifically, we show a characterized solution for this problem, mainly adapting the well-known axioms that characterize the Shapley value for TU-games into our context. Finally, we present some additional properties that the shown solution satisfy.
RECENT SCHOLAR PUBLICATIONS
Cooperative game theoretic results from the tuna fishing problem G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos International Journal of Game Theory 54 (2), 1-24 , 2025 2025
On tuna fishing games G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos 2025
On tuna fishing games A Navarro-Ramos, G Bergantinos Available at SSRN 5183225 , 2025 2025
Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value for multi-choice games S Béal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rémila, P Solal Annals of Operations Research 345 (1), 59-103 , 2025 2025 Citations: 6
A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption A Navarro-Ramos, W Olvera-Lopez 2025 Citations: 2
Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values S Beal, S Ferrieres, A Navarro‐Ramos, P Solal International Journal of Economic Theory 19 (4), 787-816 , 2023 2023 Citations: 4
Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos International Journal of Game Theory 52 (1), 63-92 , 2023 2023 Citations: 4
Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value S Béal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rémila, P Solal 2023 Citations: 2
A new approach to agglomeration problems A Navarro-Ramos Operations Research Letters 50 (6), 639-645 , 2022 2022 Citations: 3
Axiomatic Characterizations of the Knapsack and Greedy Participatory Budgeting Methods F Ceron, S Gonzalez, A Navarro-Ramos Working paper (2022).(Cited on page 65) , 2022 2022 Citations: 2
A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values S Béal, S Ferrières, A Navarro-Ramos, P Solal 2022
On multi-source minimum cost spanning tree problems and agglomeration problems A Navarro Ramos Estatística e investigación operativa , 2021 2021
A characterization of the folk rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos Operations Research Letters 47 (5), 366-370 , 2019 2019 Citations: 7
The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos Mathematical Social Sciences 99, 43-48 , 2019 2019 Citations: 8
Characterization of the painting rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems G Bergantiños, A Navarro 2019
Soluciones axiomáticas para un problema de distribución de costos con consumo sin rivalidad A Navarro Ramos REPOSITORIO NACIONAL CONACYT , 2015 2015 Citations: 1
MOST CITED SCHOLAR PUBLICATIONS
The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos Mathematical Social Sciences 99, 43-48 , 2019 2019 Citations: 8
A characterization of the folk rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos Operations Research Letters 47 (5), 366-370 , 2019 2019 Citations: 7
Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value for multi-choice games S Béal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rémila, P Solal Annals of Operations Research 345 (1), 59-103 , 2025 2025 Citations: 6
Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values S Beal, S Ferrieres, A Navarro‐Ramos, P Solal International Journal of Economic Theory 19 (4), 787-816 , 2023 2023 Citations: 4
Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos International Journal of Game Theory 52 (1), 63-92 , 2023 2023 Citations: 4
A new approach to agglomeration problems A Navarro-Ramos Operations Research Letters 50 (6), 639-645 , 2022 2022 Citations: 3
A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption A Navarro-Ramos, W Olvera-Lopez 2025 Citations: 2
Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value S Béal, A Navarro-Ramos, E Rémila, P Solal 2023 Citations: 2
Axiomatic Characterizations of the Knapsack and Greedy Participatory Budgeting Methods F Ceron, S Gonzalez, A Navarro-Ramos Working paper (2022).(Cited on page 65) , 2022 2022 Citations: 2
Soluciones axiomáticas para un problema de distribución de costos con consumo sin rivalidad A Navarro Ramos REPOSITORIO NACIONAL CONACYT , 2015 2015 Citations: 1
Cooperative game theoretic results from the tuna fishing problem G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos International Journal of Game Theory 54 (2), 1-24 , 2025 2025
On tuna fishing games G Bergantiños, A Navarro-Ramos 2025
On tuna fishing games A Navarro-Ramos, G Bergantinos Available at SSRN 5183225 , 2025 2025
A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values S Béal, S Ferrières, A Navarro-Ramos, P Solal 2022
On multi-source minimum cost spanning tree problems and agglomeration problems A Navarro Ramos Estatística e investigación operativa , 2021 2021
Characterization of the painting rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems G Bergantiños, A Navarro 2019
