Karoly Mike

@elte.hu

associate professor, Department of Economics and Statistics, Faculty of Law
Eötvös Loránd University

Karoly Mike


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https://researchid.co/karolymike
2021- Associate Professor, Head of Department of Economics and Statistics Eötvös University, Faculty of Law
2019-2020 Dean, Faculty of Economics & Vice Rector for Faculty, Corvinus University of Budapest
2014-2021 External Senior Research Fellow Hetfa Research Institute
2012-2014 Senior Research Fellow Hetfa Research Institute
2009-2012 Director Széchenyi College of Advanced Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest
2005-2012; 2014-2021 Lecturer (Assistant, then Associate Professor) Corvinus University of Budapest

EDUCATION

2010 PhD (Economics), Corvinus University of Budapest
2002 MSc (Economics), Corvinus University of Budapest

RESEARCH, TEACHING, or OTHER INTERESTS

Economics and Econometrics, Law
9

Scopus Publications

165

Scholar Citations

7

Scholar h-index

6

Scholar i10-index

Scopus Publications

  • Economists or lawyers? Who is better at designing institutions?
    Károly Mike
    Journal of Institutional Economics, 2025
    What can economists and lawyers contribute to the stock of useful knowledge for designing institutions? How do their contributions differ? I argue that law and economics generate two complementary but distinct types of knowledge. At its core, legal knowledge is participatory and internal to law’s practice, while economic knowledge is observational and external. Drawing on Michael Polanyi’s concept of ‘intellectual orders’, I propose that economics as a social science and law as a primarily practical profession each rely on complex institutions to generate their respective types of knowledge. The comparative analysis clarifies the potential and limits of using economics for institutional design, the role of law as a knowledge-generating profession, and principles for intellectual collaboration.
  • The New Moral Absolutism in Catholic Moral Teaching: A Critique Based on Veritatis Splendor
    Károly Mike
    Religions, 2025
    This paper examines a recent shift in Catholic moral teaching, characterized by the emergence of a ‘new moral absolutism’, in which certain acts traditionally subject to prudential judgment—such as the death penalty, ecological harm, and restrictive migration policies—are increasingly portrayed as universally and gravely wrong in our age. Simultaneously, traditional moral absolutes, especially in sexual and life ethics, have experienced cautious relativization. Drawing on the framework of Veritatis Splendor (1993), the paper critiques the approach of this new moral absolutism, arguing that it undermines the proper role of individual conscience and situational discernment while failing to provide coherent guidance on complex moral dilemmas. It links its emergence to proportionalist ethics: when traditional moral absolutes are relativized, new types of wrongs take their place. The paper proposes a return to the principles of Veritatis Splendor, advocating for a nuanced approach that preserves the constant and limited set of absolute negative norms and encourages the formation and use of conscience for all other matters.
  • How do business associations support contract enforcement? Evidence from Hungary
    Károly Mike, István Boza, Gábor Tamás Molnár
    Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2024
    Business associations (BAs) are often mentioned among formal private‐order institutions that support contract enforcement. Despite their ubiquity, evidence about their actual roles is still very limited. We explore empirically four mechanisms through which they can support the credibility of contractual commitments: member selection, norm enforcement, dispute resolution and information sharing. In a developed legal context, firm‐level data from an economy‐wide managerial survey show that BAs support contractual trust among members, in members by outsiders as well as in outsiders by members. Member selection and information sharing stand out as the most important mechanisms: They help all three relationship types. Dispute resolution helps overcome opportunism between members only. Formalized norm enforcement is a signal of trustworthiness for outsiders. Economic theory suggests that BAs can help establish trust beyond personal and local networks. We find strong evidence that they indeed do.
  • Combining formal and informal contract enforcement in a developed legal system: a latent class approach
    Károly Mike, Gábor Kiss
    Journal of Institutional Economics, 2019
    How do firms combine a broad range of contract enforcement mechanisms into coherent governance structures? How often are distinct structures used in an economy? We develop a new empirical approach, based on latent class analysis, to answer these questions. Economy-level data from Hungary are used to derive a data-driven typology of contractual governance between firms. The joint use of law, morality, self-enforcing contracts, reputation and community norms is examined. They are shown to be combined into bilateral, third-party or comprehensive governance structures. The crucial governance choice is whether to move beyond bilateralism and, if yes, whether to use a mixture of (formal and informal) third-party mechanisms as a substitute or a complement. Complementarity is much more common. We find no instances of ‘impersonal exchange’; the law never stands alone. By implication, economic development may be best understood as a process from a narrower towards a broader set of enforcement mechanisms.
  • Communities after markets. The long road of winemakers to self-governance in post-communist Hungary
    Károly Mike, Boldizsár Megyesi
    Geoforum, 2018
  • The intellectual orders of a market economy
    KÁROLY MIKE
    Journal of Institutional Economics, 2017
    Not only do ideas matter in economic development but so do the institutions of intellectual debates in which ideas are formed. Scholars usually point to intellectual debates whose institutions are largely exogenous to the economy (e.g. those of religion or science). I suggest that economists should also consider intellectual debates that are initiated by economic actors. I set out to understand the role of intellectual debate in the economy and, drawing on Polanyi's concept of ‘intellectual order’, the institutions that emerge endogenously to support it. Professional communities and public intellectual spheres are shown as the most important examples. Three historical cases are given as illustrations. I conclude that these intellectual orders should be included among the fundamental ‘institutions of capitalism’, along with the catallactic institutions of property and contract.
  • Organising collective reputation: An Ostromian perspective
    Boldizsár Megyesi, Károly Mike
    International Journal of the Commons, 2016
    What do collective reputation and communal pastures have in common? Collective reputation is an important type of collective good produced by many business networks. We argue that it has the structure of a common-pool resource, which points to the relevance of Elinor Ostrom’s theory about the community governance of natural common-pool resources. After adapting the Ostromian framework to the phenomenon of collective reputation, we explore the experience of two groups of winemaking enterprises in Hungary who set up systems of quality assurance in order to protect and improve their joint reputation. We examine if the conditions identified by Ostrom as favourable for the self-governance of commons are also conducive to the governance of collective reputation. Our findings validate our conjecture that research on goal-oriented business networks may use insights from the mature theory of ‘governing the commons’. Potential pathways for further research are outlined.
  • Measuring for Absorption: How the Institutionalisation of EU Cohesion Policy Influences the Use of Performance Indicators in Hungary
    Károly Mike, Gábor Balás
    Nispacee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 2015
    We investigate the performance measurement of the implementing agencies of EU Structural Funds in Hungary. Following the advice of Thiel and Leeuw (2002), we focus on the incentives created by the institutional environment of these agencies. The core of this environment is a double principal-agent relationship between the European Commission (EC), the national government and the Managing Authority. We investigate its institutional features and the resulting organisational incentives for Managing Authorities in Hungary. Relying on programme evaluations, we explore how these incentives actually affected the design and use of performance measurement by Authorities in two policy fields: active labour-market policy and higher education. We find that external incentives to focus on absorption and formal compliance created bias against integrating performance measurement into the policy process and tackling problems of performance risk and non-measurability.
  • Eurocratic tribe. A source of conflict in public administration in the new member states
    Károly Mike
    Revue Francaise D Administration Publique, 2005
    The Eurocratic Tribe. A Source of Conflict in Public Administration in the New Member States. The EU bureaucracy was set up to ensure the implementation of common policies and to coordinate the policies of Member States. But the activities for which it is responsible may impinge on the field of action of strictly national administrations. The author shows that there are similarities between the situation and behaviour of eurocrats within the administrations of Member States and those of a “tribe” within a large, hierarchised organisation. He asserts that the establishment of a national eurocracy is essential because it alone is competent to deal with the Commission and the other EU countries on European subjects.

RECENT SCHOLAR PUBLICATIONS

  • The New Moral Absolutism in Catholic Moral Teaching: A Critique Based on Veritatis Splendor
    K Mike
    Religions 16 (2), 149 , 2025
    2025
  • Economists or lawyers? Who is better at designing institutions?
    K Mike
    Journal of Institutional Economics 21, e30 , 2025
    2025
  • How do business associations support contract enforcement? Evidence from Hungary
    K Mike, I Boza, GT Molnár
    Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 95 (4), 1021-1060 , 2024
    2024
  • Emberi természet és magántulajdon–a Rerum novarum természetjogi érvelése
    K Mike
    Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó , 2023
    2023
  • Kollektív márkák és önszerveződés a Szekszárdi borvidéken
    K Mike, B Kucsera
    KULTÚRA ÉS KÖZÖSSÉG 12 (1), 21-33 , 2021
    2021
  • A kollektív cselekvés vállalkozói: Példák a magyar borászok helyi szerveződéseinek köréből
    K Bence, M Károly
    Socio. hu Társadalomtudományi Szemle 10 (3), 94-122 , 2020
    2020
  • Szelíd kapitalizmus: A szabad együttműködés rendje
    K Mike
    Gondolat Publishers , 2020
    2020
    Citations: 6
  • Combining formal and informal contract enforcement in a developed legal system: a latent class approach
    K Mike, G Kiss
    Journal of Institutional Economics 15 (3), 521-537 , 2019
    2019
    Citations: 20
  • Egy innováció a Közgazdaságtudományi Karon: Út a Közszolgálati Tanszéktől a Közgazdálkodási és Közpolitikai Tanszékig
    H György, J György, M Károly, V László
    2019
    Citations: 1
  • A hitelesség táguló körei: szerződéskikényszerítő intézmények és a vállalkozások növekedése
    K Mike
    VEZETÉSTUDOMÁNY 49 (2), 2-11 , 2018
    2018
    Citations: 2
  • Communities after markets. The long road of winemakers to self-governance in post-communist Hungary
    K Mike, B Megyesi
    Geoforum 88, 129-137 , 2018
    2018
    Citations: 9
  • The intellectual orders of a market economy
    K Mike
    Journal of Institutional Economics 13 (4), 899-915 , 2017
    2017
    Citations: 12
  • Who can actually craft institutions? On the institutional calculation debate
    K Mike
    2017
  • Beyond the Informal/Formal Divide: How do Firms Combine Contract-enforcement Institutions?
    K Mike, G Kiss
    No. 2017/21 , 2017
    2017
    Citations: 4
  • Hitelesek-e a vállalkozások ígéretei magyarországon?
    K Mike, G Kiss
    Közgazdasági Szemle 64 (12), 1285-1315 , 2017
    2017
    Citations: 2
  • Organising collective reputation: an Ostromian perspective
    B Megyesi, K Mike
    International Journal of the Commons 10 (2) , 2016
    2016
    Citations: 23
  • How do firms actually combine personal and impersonal institutions to safeguard their contracts?
    K Mike, G Kiss
    2016
  • Measuring for Absorption: How the Institutionalisation of EU Cohesion Policy Influences the Use of Performance Indicators in Hungary
    K Mike, G Balás
    NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 8 (2), 125-147 , 2016
    2016
    Citations: 10
  • Merre vezessen a magyar kapitalizmus útja? Látkép Ronald Coase világítótornyából= Which course for Hungary s capitalism? A view from Ronald Coase s lighthouse
    K Mike
    Közgazdasági Szemle 63 (6), 597-614 , 2016
    2016
  • Kevesebb vagy több közgazdaságtant?
    K Mike
    KÖZGAZDASÁGI SZEMLE 62 (3), 335-340 , 2015
    2015

MOST CITED SCHOLAR PUBLICATIONS

  • Organising collective reputation: an Ostromian perspective
    B Megyesi, K Mike
    International Journal of the Commons 10 (2) , 2016
    2016
    Citations: 23
  • Combining formal and informal contract enforcement in a developed legal system: a latent class approach
    K Mike, G Kiss
    Journal of Institutional Economics 15 (3), 521-537 , 2019
    2019
    Citations: 20
  • Public administration and public policy degree programmes in Europe: The road from Bologna
    G Jenei, K Mike
    NISPAcee , 2008
    2008
    Citations: 13
  • The intellectual orders of a market economy
    K Mike
    Journal of Institutional Economics 13 (4), 899-915 , 2017
    2017
    Citations: 12
  • Measuring for Absorption: How the Institutionalisation of EU Cohesion Policy Influences the Use of Performance Indicators in Hungary
    K Mike, G Balás
    NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 8 (2), 125-147 , 2016
    2016
    Citations: 10
  • A gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal nemzetek fölötti centralizációja és a közösségi gazdaságtan. Az adóverseny elméletének néhány tanulsága (Supranational centralization of …
    K Mike
    Közgazdasági Szemle 50 (3), 254-268 , 2003
    2003
    Citations: 10
  • Communities after markets. The long road of winemakers to self-governance in post-communist Hungary
    K Mike, B Megyesi
    Geoforum 88, 129-137 , 2018
    2018
    Citations: 9
  • Az európai vállalkozó karaktere
    A Csite, A Luksander, K Mike
    Vezetéstudomány 43 (KSZ), 4-13 , 2012
    2012
    Citations: 7
  • Maguk urai–a magyar vállalkozó lelkialkata
    A Luksander, K Mike, A Csite
    A magyarországi kisvállalkozók értékvilágának néhány jellemzője. TM 67 , 2010
    2010
    Citations: 7
  • Szelíd kapitalizmus: A szabad együttműködés rendje
    K Mike
    Gondolat Publishers , 2020
    2020
    Citations: 6
  • Maguk urai–a magyar vállalkozó lelkialkata (A magyarországi kisvállalkozók értékvilágának néhány jellemzője)-----It's title in English: Their own bosses–The character of the …
    A Luksander, K Mike, A Csite
    Vállalatgazdaságtan Intézet , 2012
    2012
    Citations: 6
  • Kivonulás, tiltakozás és hűség az Európai Unióban: A specifikus beruházások jelentősége
    K Mike
    Századvég 50 (4), 79-106 , 2008
    2008
    Citations: 6
  • Mandatory Rule in Contract Law
    A Menyhárd, K Mike, Á Szalai
    German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2007 (18) , 2007
    2007
    Citations: 6
  • Hirschman meets Williamson: Relationship-specific investment and loyalty
    K Mike
    Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 3 (2), 55-81 , 2012
    2012
    Citations: 5
  • Beyond the Informal/Formal Divide: How do Firms Combine Contract-enforcement Institutions?
    K Mike, G Kiss
    No. 2017/21 , 2017
    2017
    Citations: 4
  • Contracting for Structural Funds-How the EU's Rules of the Game Shape the Behaviour of Member State Governments
    K Mike, G Balás
    HETFA Working Papers , 2014
    2014
    Citations: 4
  • An Unhappy Consensus: EU membership and party collusion in Hungary
    K Mike
    World Political Science 3 (4) , 2008
    2008
    Citations: 4
  • A hitelesség táguló körei: szerződéskikényszerítő intézmények és a vállalkozások növekedése
    K Mike
    VEZETÉSTUDOMÁNY 49 (2), 2-11 , 2018
    2018
    Citations: 2
  • Hitelesek-e a vállalkozások ígéretei magyarországon?
    K Mike, G Kiss
    Közgazdasági Szemle 64 (12), 1285-1315 , 2017
    2017
    Citations: 2
  • Ronald Coase-Itt és most
    K Mike
    Közgazdasági Szemle 61 (3), 315-323 , 2014
    2014
    Citations: 2